Conceptualising Contestability: Perspectives on Contesting Algorithmic Decisions

Abstract

As the use of algorithmic systems in high-stakes decision-making increases, the ability to contest algorithmic decisions is being recognised as an important safeguard for individuals. Yet, there is little guidance on what `contestability'--the ability to contest decisions--in relation to algorithmic decision-making requires. Recent research presents different conceptualisations of contestability in algorithmic decision-making. We contribute to this growing body of work by describing and analysing the perspectives of people and organisations who made submissions in response to Australia's proposed `AI Ethics Framework', the first framework of its kind to include `contestability' as a core ethical principle. Our findings reveal that while the nature of contestability is disputed, it is seen as a way to protect individuals, and it resembles contestability in relation to human decision-making. We reflect on and discuss the implications of these findings.

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