Chatting with bots: AI, speech acts, and the edge of assertion

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of whether large language model-powered\nchatbots are capable of assertion. According to what we call the Thesis of\nChatbot Assertion (TCA), chatbots are the kinds of things that can assert, and\nat least some of the output produced by current-generation chatbots qualifies\nas assertion. We provide some motivation for TCA, arguing that it ought to be\ntaken seriously and not simply dismissed. We also review recent objections to\nTCA, arguing that these objections are weighty. We thus confront the following\ndilemma: how can we do justice to both the considerations for and against TCA?\nWe consider two influential responses to this dilemma - the first appeals to\nthe notion of proxy-assertion; the second appeals to fictionalism - and argue\nthat neither is satisfactory. Instead, reflecting on the ontogenesis of\nassertion, we argue that we need to make space for a category of\nproto-assertion. We then apply the category of proto-assertion to chatbots,\narguing that treating chatbots as proto-assertors provides a satisfactory\nresolution to the dilemma of chatbot assertion.\n

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